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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of transaction taxes on depth and bid-ask spread under 
asymmetric information. The paper uses a static model where a monopolistic market maker 
faces liquidity and informed traders. Introducing transaction taxes could, surprisingly, lead to 
increase in depth. Under some distributional assumptions, when market conditions are 
favorable to the dealer, the spread responds less than proportionally to an increase in the 
transaction tax while the depth actually increases. In contrast, when market conditions are 
unfavorable to the dealer, the spread widens more than proportionally and the depth 
decreases, potentially to zero, in response to an increase in the transaction tax. Our model 
sheds light on the disagreement in the empirical literature on the relative magnitude of 
transaction costs on trading volume. 
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates the eﬀects of securities transaction taxes (STT) on the liquidity of a
quote-driven market under asymmetric information. Academics and Þnancial market regulators
(e.g. Dow and Rahi (2000, OECD (2002), and Hakkio (1994)) have studied the potential eﬀects of
imposing securities transaction taxes (akin to the Tobin tax) as an instrument to curb speculation
and excess volatility without impairing market liquidity. Kyle (1985) states that liquidity can
be measured by bid-ask spread, depth and resiliency.1 Past research, however, uses an aggregate
measure of liquidity, trading volume, in analysing the relationship between transaction costs and
liquidity. In this paper, we examine the eﬀects of taxation on a disaggregate level using bid-ask
spread and depth.2 Consequently, our results can accommodate some of the disagreements in the
empirical literature on the relative magnitude of transaction taxes on trading volume (Kandel
and Marx (1998) and Brennen, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998)).
Our model builds on Glosten and Milgrom (1985), who study the pricing strategy of an
uninformed market maker facing potentially better informed traders. Our approach, however,
diﬀers from Glosten and Milgrom (1985) in the following way. First, they assume the existence
of an equilibrium whereas we characterize the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in
our framework. Moreover, as in Dupont (2000), we incorporate both spread and depth into a
model that allows the theoretical dealer to adjust the depth diﬀerently than the bid-ask spread
in response to changes in the degree of information asymmetry. In this setting, we analyze the
eﬀects of transaction tax on market liquidity across diﬀerent levels of information asymmetry.
1Resiliency is the speed with which price ßuctuations resulting from trades are dissipated, and depth is the
maximum amount the dealer stands ready to sell or buy at the posted prices. See Kyle (1985) for details.
2Previous research on the relationship between transaction costs and trading volume can be used to study
the eﬀects of transaction taxes on liquidity (see among many, Constantinides (1986), Barclay, Kandel and Marx
(1998), Vayanos (1998), and Vayanos andVila (1999)).
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Our analysis uses a one-period model where a monopolistic market maker posts Þrm prices
(including tax) and depths on the bid and ask sides, while facing a risk-neutral informed trader
and a liquidity trader. The informed trader observes a private signal correlated with the true
value of the asset. The demand of the liquidity trader is price sensitive and subject to the
liquidity shock.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, introducing a transaction tax could lead
to either increase or decrease in depth, depending on the degree of information asymmetry
and liquidity demand. Secondly, the spread could respond disproportionally to increase in tax.
Subsequently, our results seem to point to two regimes as far as transaction tax is concerned.
First, when information asymmetry is weak or liquidity demand is strong (i.e., when market
conditions are favorable to the market maker), the market maker pays part of the transaction
tax himself by increasing the spread less than the tax. Moreover, he quotes a larger depth to
attract order ßow in order to make up for the loss in demand due to the transaction tax. On
the other hand, when market conditions are unfavorable, increasing the transaction tax leads
to a drastic reduction in the liquidity provided by the market maker, enticing him to exit the
market. In turn, the paper suggests that lowering transaction tax may not necessarily lead to
increase in quoted depth.
Our paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the model. To numerically
analyze our model under various distributional assumptions, we study two cases. Section 3
analyses the equilibrium conditions under a discrete distribution: the asset value, the informed
traders signal and the liquidity shock each take two values. Section 4 looks at the equilibrium
conditions under continuous distributions where the asset value is lognormally distributed with
mean 1. Both the private signal and the liquidity shock are, however, normally distributed.
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Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Model
A monopolistic dealer posts Þrm prices and depths on the bid and ask sides. He faces a price-
sensitive liquidity trader and a trader possessing private information about the value of the
asset. The liquidity traders demand is price sensitive and stochastic. The informed trader, who
observes a signal correlated with the true value of the asset, buys the asset if the ask is below
(or sells if the bid is above) his valuation. For simplicity, we assume no limit-order book or ßoor
brokers compete with the dealer (or specialist). The model focuses on asymmetric information
and excludes other factors such as misdiversiÞcation and order-processing costs.
To simplify computations, we assume that the informed trader is risk neutral. His demand
is satisÞed before that of the liquidity trader. This assumption simpliÞes the informed traders
demand but excludes some strategies potentially available to actual traders, such as conditioning
orders on the volume of liquidity trade. Informed and liquidity traders buy or sell orders are
lumped together and passed on to the dealer so that the quantity limit becomes binding if the
sum of all orders is greater than the posted depth.
We study only the ask side of the dealers activity as the bid side is symmetrical. Let x be
the true value of the asset, c the transaction tax, a the ask price inclusive of tax, z the quantity
limit, G the informed traders private signal, v = E[x|G] his valuation of the traded asset, η the
liquidity shock (η and G are independently distributed), and d(a) the liquidity traders demand.
The orders of the liquidity trader and of the informed trader are pooled together and passed
on to the dealer. By convention, the dealer pays the transaction tax but, ceteris paribus, the
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transaction tax could be levied on the customers. To acquire one unit of the traded asset,
informed and liquidity traders pay a but the dealer receives only (a− c) if the transaction tax
is a Þxed amount per transaction (Þxed transaction tax), or ( a1+c) if it is a Þxed percentage of
the price (proportional transaction tax).
The eﬀective demand, S(a, z, v, η), depends on the realization of liquidity shocks and the
valuation of informed trader. If v > a, then a risk neutral informed trader will demand the
maximum amount.3 On the other hand, if v · a then the informed trader does not participate
and hence the transaction volume on the ask side depends on the liquidity demand. The following
equation represents the eﬀective demand:
S(a, z, v, η) = I(v · a) I(d(a) ≥ 0) min(d(a), z) + I(v > a) z (2.1)
where I the indicator function. Consequently, the dealers net and expected proÞt are
Π =

S(a, z, v, η) (a− c− x) for linear tax
S(a, z, v, η)
³
a− c1+c − x
´
for proportional tax

(2.2)
E[π] =

E[I[v · a](a− c− v)]E[I[d(a) ≥ 0]min(d(a), z)]
+E[I[v > a](a− c− v)] z for linear tax
E[I[v · a](a/(1 + c)− v)]E[I[d(a) ≥ 0]min(d(a), z)]
+E[I[v > a](a/(1 + c)− v)] z for proportional tax

(2.3)
3 If the informed trader is risk averse then his demand remains Þnite.
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3. Equilibrium with discrete distributions
Let x and G take the values 1 or −1 and η take the values η¯ or −η¯ with probability 12 . With
the discrete distribution, the demand is d(a) = −a+ η. The informed traders valuation v takes
values v¯ = E[x|G = 1] and v = E[x|G = −1] = −v¯ with probability 12 . The tax is linear. The
market maker can take the following strategies: Table 3.1 summarizes the results.
1. The market maker can exclude the informed trader by setting the selling price above the
latters maximum valuation; a ≥ v¯. By having no informed trader, the dealer imposes
no quantity limit, z. In this case, the market maker is a monopolist facing a downward
sloping curve and his expected proÞt is
E[π] = E
·
I[d(a) ≥ 0] d(a)
¸
(a− c) = E
·
I[η ≥ a] (η − a)
¸
(a− c) =
1
2
(η¯ − a) (a− c).
The proÞt-maximizing price, (c+ η¯)/2 is the listed price provided this price is above v¯ and
the maximum value for the proÞt is 18(η¯ − c)
2. To summarize when a ≥ v¯: the optimal
price that excludes the informed trader is max[v¯, (c+ η¯)/2]; there is no quantity limit; the
maximum expected proÞt is 18(η¯ − c)
2; and the maximum amount of tax is η¯.
2. Alternatively, the market maker can set his selling price below v¯ in the hope of attracting
more demand; 0 < a < v¯.4 Naturally, he then runs the risk of being picked by the informed
trader. Given a selling price a, η¯−a is the highest possible liquidity demand.5 If the dealer
set the depth strictly above this level, he would incur extra losses when transacting with
4 If 0 < a < v¯ then I[v ≤ a] = I[v = −v¯], I[v > a] = I[v = v¯].
5We impose a ≤ η¯ since setting a above η¯ would make the liquidity demand always negative, and hence the
liquidity trader would not trade in this case.
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the informed without generating extra liquidity trade. Hence, z · η¯ − a. When the
liquidity demand is positive, it is equal to the quantity limit. Consequently, the expected
proÞt is:
E[π] = E[I[v · a](a− c− v)]E[I[d(a) ≥ 0] z] +E[I[v > a](a− c− v)] z
=
µ
E[I[v · a](a− c− v)] p(d(a) ≥ 0) +E[I[v > a](a− c− v)]
¶
z
=
µ
1
4 (a+ v¯ − c) +
1
2 (a− v¯ − c)
¶
z
= 34z(a− c−
1
3 v¯)
(3.1)
If a < c+ v¯/3, the optimal z is 0; if a > c+ v¯/3, the optimal z is the maximum quantity
limit η¯ − a; if a = c+ v¯/3, z can be set arbitrarily, for example, to zero.
With z = η¯ − a, the expected proÞt function becomes:
E[π] =
3
4
(η¯ − a) (a− c−
1
3
v¯). (3.2)
The dealer maximizes the function deÞned in Equation (3.2) under the constraint that
0 < a < v¯. If v¯ > 3 (η¯ − c), this function is negative for a < η¯ and the dealer exits the
market. If v¯ · 3 (η¯ − c), the price that maximizes E[π] without the constraint a < v¯,
1
2(c+ η¯) +
1
6 v¯, is smaller than v¯ if v¯ >
3
5 (η¯ + c). Hence, if
3
5 (c + η¯) < v¯ · 3 (η¯ − c), the
optimal price is 12 (η¯ + c)+
1
6 v¯ and the maximum proÞt is
1
48 (3η¯ − 3c− v¯)
2; if v¯ · 35(c+ η¯),
the constraint a < v¯ is binding; in the limit, the dealer wants to set a = v¯.
The Þnal step is to compare the maximum expected proÞt when a > v¯ and when a · v¯.
When 35(η¯ + c) < v¯ < 3 (η¯ − c), maximizing expected proÞt setting a ≥ v¯ would yield a lower
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Table 3.1: Equilibrium price and quantity limit with risk-neutral informed trader and discrete
distributions.
v¯ v¯ · 12(η¯ + c)
1
2(η¯ + c) < v¯
3
5 (η¯ + c) < v¯ v¯ > 3(η¯ − c)
· 35(η¯ + c) · 3(η¯ − c)
optimal a 12 (η¯ + c) v¯
1
2 η¯+
1
2 c+
1
6 v¯ n.a.
optimal z n.a. n.a. 12 η¯−
1
2 c−
1
6 v¯ 0
max (E[π]) 18 (η¯ − c)
2 1
2 (v¯ − c) (η¯ − v¯)
1
48 (3η¯ − 3c− v¯)
2 0
maximum c η¯ 23 η¯
1
4 η¯ 0
When a ≥ v¯, imposing a quantity limit is not necessary; the optimal z is undeÞned and n.a. is
entered in the corresponding cell. When v¯ > 3 (η¯ − c), the expected proÞt is never positive and the
dealer exits the market by setting z to 0; the optimal a is undeÞned and n.a. is entered in the
corresponding cell.
maximum than letting a < v¯. The optimal price and depth in this case are a∗ = 12(η¯ + c) +
1
6 v¯
and z∗ = η¯ − a∗. When 12(η¯ + c) < v¯ ·
3
5(η¯ + c), the optimal price is ν and no quantity limit
need be imposed. When v¯ ≥ 3(η¯ − c), the depth is set to zero and no price need be quoted.
For expositional purpose, Figure 3.1 maps the results in Table 3.1. Figure 3.1 plots the half
spread, a, and the depth, z, against the informed traders valuation, v¯. The main message from
Figure 3.1 is that the introducing of a transaction cost has non-linear eﬀects on the spread and
the depth. When the random variables follow discrete distributions, imposing a Þnite depth is
not necessary if the asymmetry in information is low enough. For example, in the region where
v¯ ∈
¡
0, 35
¢
, a small increase in the transaction cost pushes up the spread but does not aﬀect
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the depth6, while a larger change may result in the imposition of a Þnite quantity limit but
may not translate into a spread increase of equal magnitude. In contrast, when the information
asymmetry is more severe, v¯ ∈
¡
3
5 , 3
¢
, and the quantity limits are imposed, an increase in the
transaction cost has a proportional eﬀect on the spread.
4. Equilibrium with continuous distributions
In the following section, we take the asset value, x, to be lognormally distributed. With the
lognormal distribution, the demand is d(a) = − log(a)+ η and y = log(x). We also assume that
the distribution of (x, η, G) is common knowledge with η and G are normally distributed.
4.1. Marginal condition
Although no equilibrium closed-form solution exists, the marginal conditions for the price and
the quantity limit shed light on the trade-oﬀs governing the dealers proÞt maximization.
The Þrst derivative of the specialists expected proÞt with respect to the quantity limit is
given in Equation (4.1); the one with respect to the ask price is given in Equation (4.2), where
d0(a) denotes the slope of the liquidity demand at price a.7
∂
∂z
E[π] = p(d(a) > z) E
·
I[v · a] (a− c− v)
¸
+E
·
I[v > a] (a− c− v)
¸
, (4.1)
∂
∂aE[π] = p(v > a) z + p(v · a) E
·
I[d(a) ≥ 0] min(d(a), z)
¸
+ d0(a) p(0 · d(a) · z) E
·
I[v · a] (a− c− v)
¸
.
(4.2)
6 In fact, the depth in this region is undeÞned.
7The derivation of equations (4.1) and (4.2) can be provided upon request.
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Figure 3.1: Half-spread and depth when the informed traders valuation and the liquidty shock each
take two values with probability 1/2. The positive value of the liquidity shock is 1, that of the in-
formed traders valuation is v and is displayed on the horizontal axis. This Þgure represents the market
conditions facing the dealer.
9
Equation (4.1) has an intuitive interpretation. Increasing the quantity limit by an inÞnitesimal
amount brings the market maker a proÞt equal to E
·
I[v · a] (a− c− v)
¸
if the limit is hit by
a liquidity trader, or a loss equal to E
·
I[v > a] (a− c − v)
¸
if it is hit by an informed trader.
Equation (4.2) is similar to the standard monopolistic case in which increasing the price by $1
makes the monopolist earn another $1 on the total volume but reduces the overall demand.
The Þrst two terms on the right-hand side of Equation (4.2) represent the expected sales when
the informed trader wants to trade, p(v > a) z, and when he does not, p(v · a) E
·
I[d(a) ≥
0] min(d(a), z)
¸
. The last term represents the impact on proÞts resulting from the reduction in
overall demand. A price increase depresses demand if the quantity limit is not binding, that is,
if the liquidity traders demand is positive but lower than z and the informed traders evaluation
is below a. In this event, the eﬀect on overall demand is proportional to the slope of the liquidity
traders demand.
4.2. Expected dealer’s profit
We assume that the informed trader is endowed with a negative exponential utility function with
risk aversion γ. Equivalently, the informed trader maximizes E[πi|G]− γ var(πi|G)/2, where πi
is the informed traders proÞt and var(πi|G) is the conditional variance of his proÞt given G.
We assume that his initial wealth is conditionally independent of the value of the asset and the
liquidity shock. The informed trader chooses the quantity q to maximize
q (E[x|G]− a− c)−
1
2
q2 γ var(x|G), (4.3)
10
where var(x|G) is the conditional variance of x given G. As the informed traders orders are
Þlled before those of the liquidity trader, the informed traders demand function is
q(a) = max
·
0,
µ
γ var(x|G)
¶−1
(v − a− c)
¸
, (4.4)
with var(x|G) = σ2x(1 − ρ
2). When x is lognormally distributed, this is not linear in v be-
cause the conditional variance of x given G depends on the realization of G: var(x|G) =£
exp
¡
(1− ρ2)σ2y
¢
− 1
¤
v2, where σy is the standard deviation of y = log(x) and ρ = corr(G, y).8
Thus, the informed traders demand is deÞned by
q(a, c, v) =
1
θ
max[0,
1
v
−
a+ c
v2
],
where θ = γ
£
exp
¡
(1− ρ2)σ2y
¢
− 1
¤
.
4.3. Numerical Results
When x is lognormally distributed, we search for the optimal price (or spread) and for the
optimal depth numerically. The dealers proÞt maximization simpliÞes to a one-dimensional
problem when the informed trader is risk neutral because the optimal depth in this case can be
written as a function of the spread.
Figure 4.1 graphs the half-spread and depth, both divided by ση, against against ρσy/ση
when x is lognormally distributed and ση = 0.1.9 Figure 4.1 uses a logarithmic scale for the
8To compute the conditional variance in the lognormal case, use var(x|G) = E[x2|G]−E[x|G]2 together with
the fact that log(x), log(x2), and G are jointly normally distributed.
9Note that note that v¯ = ρ σy and η¯ = ση . Consequently, an increase in ρ σy/ση represents an increase in the
degree of asymmetric information: the valuation of informed trader increase, which translates into an unfavorable
market condition for the dealer.
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vertical axis. As in the discrete case, introducing a transaction cost has non-linear eﬀects on
the spread and the depth and the eﬀect depends on whether market conditions are favorable or
unfavorable to the dealer.
The spread increases and the depth decreases with ρσy/ση. When market conditions are
very favorable - that is, the informed trader is poorly informed - the depth grows without bound
while the spread remains Þnite because of the dealers market power. When market conditions
become very unfavorable, the dealer exits the market by setting the depth to 0 while maintaining
a Þnite spread. When x is lognormally distributed, half-spread and depth are approximately
proportional to ση. For example, for ρσy/ση = 0.5, the half-spread equals about 0.8 percent
when ση = 0.01 and 9 percent when ση = 0.1.10
When market conditions are favorable to the dealer (e.g. ρσy/ση ∈ (0.2, 0.4)), introducing
a transaction cost increases the spread by less than the amount of the transaction cost and
creates a larger depth. On the other hand, when market conditions are unfavorable to the
dealer (e.g. ρσy/ση ∈ (0.8, 1.0)), introducing a transaction cost pushes the price up by more
than the transaction cost and narrows the depth.
Furthermore, for both the discrete and continuous cases, the strength of the liquidity demand
plays a central role in determining the equilibrium spread and depth. When studying the
market marking process, one can focus on the liquidity conditions the dealer faces rather than
on information asymmetry. This is particularly suited to the U.S. government bond market.
For example, spreads are typically narrower and depth larger for securities that are the most
recent issues in their maturity class (the on-the-run Treasuries) than for similar securities issued
10Making the informed trader risk averse and choosing diﬀerent volatilities for the asset and the liquidity shock
do not qualitatively aﬀect the results.
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Figure 4.1: Half-spread (in percentage) and depth with a proportional transaction cost of 1 percent
(solid line) and without transaction cost (short-dashed line). The asset value, x, is lognormally distrib-
uted and y = log(x). In the top panel, the long-dashed line is the sum of the price without transaction
cost and the transaction cost. Half-spread and depth are divided by ση.
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just before (the oﬀ-the-run Treasuries). Bid-ask spreads on coupon Treasury securities have
traditionally been about twice as high for oﬀ-the-run issues than for comparable on-the-run
issues, while quoted depth is lower. Moreover, during the recent bouts of market volatility, bid-
ask spreads have widened and depth has contracted proportionally more for oﬀ-the-run than
for on-the-run coupon securities. The asymmetric information argument cannot easily account
for this fact since the quality of private information should be equal across the two market
segments. However, agents trading bonds prefer to trade in the on-the-run securities, therefore
creating a stronger liquidity demand in that market. The more fundamental question as to why
agents prefer to trade in the on-the-run segment is not addressed here, although self-fulÞlling
expectation arguments could be made.
The paper seems to point to two regimes as far as transaction cost is concerned. When market
conditions are favorable, the dealer pays part of the transaction cost himself (by increasing the
spread less than the cost) and quotes a larger depth to attract order ßow in order to make
up for the loss in demand due to the transaction cost. The increase in the depth oﬀsets,
albeit partially, the eﬀect on trading volume of the wider spread. When market conditions are
unfavorable, increasing the transaction cost leads to a drastic reduction in the liquidity provided
by the market maker, enticing him to exit the market.
Although, the implications of the model have been introduced by presenting the eﬀect on
the spread and the depth of an increase in the transaction cost, symmetric conclusions hold for
a reduction in this cost. As a consequence, a decision to lower taxes on transactions in the hope
of improving market liquidity might actually lead to smaller depths and a less-than-proportional
reduction in the spreads. This is because, when market conditions are rather favorable to the
dealer, a taxinsofar as it is at least partially reßected in the bid and ask pricesreduces the
14
probability of the informed traders buying at the ask or selling at the bid. This additional
protection entices the market maker to quote a larger depth than he would without tax.
5. Conclusion
The model shows that introducing a transaction tax could aﬀect market liquidity diﬀerently
depending on the market conditions facing the dealer. If the asset value, the informed traders
signal, and the liquidity shock each take two values, there is an interval for the precision of
the private signal for which increasing the transaction tax has no or little eﬀect on the spread
(no quantity limit is necessary then). If the asset value is lognormally distributed, the market
maker widens the spread by less than the transaction tax and actually increases the depth when
the degree of information asymmetry is subdued or liquidity demand is strong. In contrast,
when market conditions are unfavorable to the dealer, he increases the spread by more than
the transaction tax and reduces the depth. For all distributions, introducing a transaction tax
may induce the dealer to exit the market before he would have done so in the absence of a
transaction tax. This suggests that a transaction tax could aggravate liquidity loss in periods
of market stress.
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